Science as a prejudice A "scientific" interpretation of the world . . . might yet be one of the most stupid of all possible interpretations of the world, in the sense that it would be one of the poorest in meaning. This thought is intended for the ears and consciences of our mechanists who nowadays like to pass as philosophers and insist that mechanics is the doctrine of the first and last laws on which all existence must be based as on a ground floor. But an essentially mechanical world would be an essentially meaningless world.
Of course Nietzsche was not opposed to science (Wissenschaft); he held an extremely high regard for it.
The quotes surrounding the word 'scientific' in the passage indicate that it is a peculiar conception of science he is disparaging-one which construes the method of natural science as the supreme model for all knowledge-productive inquiries into the nature of human experience. Calling in Nietzsche from left field to hurl an objection at Quine may seem impertinent but is not as arbitrary as might first appear. For Nietzsche was among the first major thinkers to prescribe an investigation into the extent to which language seduces its users into holding beliefs of a scientifically dubious and metaphysical kind. But-it must be admitted-the spirit in which Nietzsche called for such an analysis of language is not the spirit "in which Quine conducts it. For at the heart of Nietzsche's comment above is the question of the value of science within the overall experience of man, whereas Quine's attitude in this respect may safely be called dogmatic. The value of scientific inquiry is not a thing to be questioned for Quine; its pragmatic benefits are evident enough. Still, Nietzsche's questioning of the dogma might yet be regarded as truer to the traditional spirit of science. These reflections do not imply a preference of one sense of scientific over another, nor need they oblige one to explicate what is meant by the word 'scientific'. The difference can be sufficiently accounted for by resorting to the traditional distinction between science and philosophy. Quine treats the distinction as only a matter of degree, the philosopher's task differing from that of the scientist only "in detail." Both are concerned "to save the eventual connections with nonverbal stimulation'; 7 the philosopher merely does his job at a further remove, supporting the scientific enterprise the cutting edge of which is empirical science itself. Nietzsche sees empirical science as exemplifying certain presuppositions which, however valuable they may be to science itself, the seeker after knowledge cannot take for granted and must be prepared to question. Such a taking of accounts has traditionally been the business of philosophy.
What follows is an attempt to assess Quine's scientific conception of philosophy. Concern with dispositions to verbal behavior, "naturalized" epistemology, the primacy of sensory evidence, the guiding principles for theory, the need for a specialized notation, and the dispensability of intensional language are the chief features of Quine's program which place philosophy on a par with science and thereby relieve it of its formerly exalted duties. Whether Quine's reallocation of philosophy is legitimate depends upon the cogency with which he has emphasized these features.
But according to what criteria is one to be convinced? How exactly is one to judge of his theory's cogency? These questions already reach to the heart of the problem, for if we choose to be satisfied on the basis of the extent to which Quine's discussion meets the standards of scientific method and scientific efficacy, then we are already playing into his hands. This is because these are the very virtues which Quine's talk of conceptualizations may perhaps best be understood in a manner somewhat similar to Hume's account of abstract ideas. The point is not that Quine thinks of conceptualizations as Humean ideas exactly, but rather that a conceptualization is conditioned according to the same sort of mechanism which Hume says leads us to think that some ideas are abstract. For Hume all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a common term which gives them a more extensive significance because the hearing of this term stimulates our power to recall any particular idea associated with that term. Thus, Hume says, these ideas (and, I am suggesting, Quine's conceptualizations) are not present to the mind actually but "only in power."* In any event, this "custom" of itself would allow no more than repetition of past conceptualizations were it not for the intervening network of sentences which enables us to "exploit" them-i.e., to use them in intelligently complicated ways. One might be inclined to infer that the connections between the sentences composing this network would be first and foremost logical and that this logical dimension would hold the network together.
But this would be rather like crediting the effectiveness with which a lifeguard performed his job to his suntan. According to Quine those logical con- Quine's main point against the view that ordinary language can serve the purposes of science is that this view is blind to one of language's most significant traits: its disposition to evolve. Quine's conception of linguistic evolution is central, for he sees its significance not in a blind progression of usage of ordinary language itself but in its tractability-its disposition to be fashioned to suit human purposes such as science.
"Scientific neologism is itself just linguist evolution gone self-conscious, as science is self-conscious common sense" (Word and Object 3). To fashion a language appropriate to science is not a matter of reduction but evolution; a continuity between ordinary language and the canonical language is sustained.
The difference between ordinary language and the technical language is a matter of "regimentation," where the latter is a conscious reformulation or paraphrase of the former designed to realize some preconceived aim.
If it is asked what this aim is we find Quine consistently resorting to the guiding principles of science already mentioned.
In particular he cites the central motive as "simplification of theory." Simplification proceeds by paraphrasing ordinary language into an artificial notation so as not to burden theory with quirks of usage. The paraphrase is not claimed as synonymous, however.
" Philosophical controversies are not to be settled by regulations governing peoples' choice of words. A school of thought which advocates this sort of conformity is, at least implicitly, less concerned with freedom of thought than with serving its own ends.
IV
A major consequence of Quine's regimentation is the prohibition of the use of intensional language in framing theories.
Two problems with intensional language make its use especially undesirable.
The conditions for identifying certain abstract objects make an empirical study of them virtually impossible. More generally, the methods used when employing intensional idioms go against the grain of objective science.
Concerning the first problem, Quine shows, for example, that the very question of conditions of identity for such things as propositions is utterly wrongheaded. For even when one construes a proposition in behavioral terms as an eternal sentence its identity will still rest on whether the proposition expressed by that sentence has a meaning which can be shared by other eternal sentences. The search for a suitable account of synonymy which could settle the matter however is fruitless. The reason is that any behavioral test for synonymy in contexts of propositional attitude is inscrutable.
There is no proposition objectively related to languages such that one could identify it independently of language. However one decides to translate the proposition expressed by some sentence so as to indicate its synonymy with another proposition will depend on some arbitrary set of "analytical hypotheses." These are arbitrary because there may be many sets of analytical hypotheses which could be used to frame a translation which are all compatible with the totality of dispositions to verbal behavior. So propositions, as objects of propositional attitudes, are impractical for any genuinely scientific enterprise.
It is worth noting that this is all of a piece with Quine's doctrine of inscrutability of reference regarding terms generally. The reference of a term, like identity of propositions, is not an empirical question. There is neither term synonymy nor term identity in the sense of there being some determinate objective thing to which a term "really" refers.
The second, more general problem with intensional locutions is that their method of employment is not conducive to objective science. Quine's treatments of modality, indirect discourse, and irreducibility of intensional idioms illustrate this. The difficulty with modal constructions is that they cannot be fitted into the technical notation that would help to clarify their significance. The reason is that modal contexts are referentially opaque and thereby resist any consistent attempt to quantify into them.
Quine's analysis on this point is very impressive and worth a brief explanation.
Quine shows that trying to reinterpret a modal expression as predicating analyticity of a sentence is unavailing for at least two reasons. First, the use of quotation marks as a means of mentioning the sentence has the consequence of failing to preserve truth value.* Second,-Quine's reflections have led him to hold that the notion of analyticity itself is of dubious integrity.' But even if one tries a different tack and construes a modal construction such as necessity as a logical operator, the principle of substitutivity, as Quine calls it, is violated; i.e., an object may be specifiable by more than one term such that some traits entailed by one specification of the object are not entailed by another, in which case these specifications fail of necessary equivalence and cannot be .substituted one for another.
Further, if through desperation one attempts to narrow the universe of .objects so as to exclude objects whose specifications fail of necessary equivalence, one is met by another difficulty: modal distinctions collapse altogether. The problem here, ultimately, is that the conception of substitutivity which trades on the notion of equivalent descriptions such that each description uniquely determines one and the same object simply does not capture the logical sense of necessity. Now since the premium Quine places on transparency of reference is the highest, modal contexts pose a seemingly insoluble problem as regards regimentation; fortunately for Quine, however, scientific philosophy doesn't need them.
Indirect quotation is probably the most candid example of Quine's complaint that intensional idioms are in direct contrast with the spirit of objective science.
Indirect quotation is unabashedly inexact and, as Quine would have it, "essentially dramatic." Indeed, propositional attitudes as a whole partake primarily of drama.
What is involved in all of them is "something like quotation of' one's own imagined verbal response to an imagined situation" (Word and Object 219). Thus, ascriptions of beliefs, wishes, and strivings, no matter how conscientiously utilized, remain inassimilable into scientific discourse at its best. Indirect quotation can figure only as better or worse, as more or less faithful, and there is no fixed standard of allowable deviation in one's report of the antecedent physical incident.
Of course, eschewing the use of such intensional idioms does not prevent a strictly scientific reporting of the behavior that underlies imputations of propositional attitudes. One may wonder, however, what philosophical scope and relevance such reportings would have. There are, after all, some facts which would seem to be irreducible to behaviorist terms unless they were to lose the very properties which constitute their status as facts. Searle's "institutional facts" are of this sort.
7
To account for every aspect of human behavior in strictly scientific terms with respect to "nerve hits" and "surface irritations" would be ludicrous.
With some irony one could paraphrase Hume: "Though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it lias carried us quite beyond the point of reasonableness when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary and so remote from common life and experience. We are got into fairy land long ere we have reached the last steps of our theory."• In any case, to have bypassed intensional vocabulary by implementing a more scientifically favorable means of expression is not to have explained the intensional dimension in these terms. Quine realizes that there is no reducibility of intensional idioms to physical or behavioral criteria. But this just means that intensional language, as far as scientific philosophy is concerned, must be renounced.
Seen in this light science appears as a truly charmed vocation, free to dispense with those refractory elements of human experience which fail of accommodation to its precepts.
One should ask, however, whether these are things which philosophy, too, may be allowed to ignore. According to Quine the answer is yes; philosophy, as well as science, is guided by pragmatic aims. One may note as a not so very strange coincidence that the moment philosophers envision their task on the model of empirical science and try to fashion it according to that idea, they see the starting points and the ends of philosophy as constrained by that selfsame point of view. Philosophy begins with sense perception as the sole basis for evidence and it ends as an activity with aims even more pragmatic than science itself--it becomes a handmaiden. V A question raised earlier in this paper concerned the problem of assessing the adequacy of a theory of knowledge. Mo systematic attempt will be made to solve this problem here, but one may wonder whether it is a problem which scientific philosophy is competent to answer at all. When Quine approaches it he immediately becomes dogmatic.
"Epistemology is concerned with the foundations of science," and thus, "natural knowledge is to be based somehow on sense experience."' On his view epistemology boils down to a matter of understanding the link between observation and science, and the guiding principles of science furnish the criteria according to which this understanding is to be gained. For Quine then the issue of assessing the adequacy of a theory of knowledge has relevance only within the domain of science itself. He could see no other sensible way of handling the problem.
We 
Anything
is, for purposes of being inquired into, constituted by a web of meanings. But the point is that not all objects of study stand in the same relation to the constellation of meanings that supports them. A fossil, for example, is experientially indifferent to its existence; it carries within itself no meanings, no concerns by which it relates itself to the world or expresses an existential outlook. This is not to deny that a particular fossil may, in some metaphysical sense, enjoy some unique point of view, but even so, this unique perspective is of no conscious concern to the fossil.
The meanings which constitute a fossil are given to it. People would not look to a fossil in order to discover what it might mean to be self-conscious or to help them understand themselves.
Yet people do desire knowledge of this kind; human beings have a real interest in self-understanding. Beyond the merely practical usefulness of such knowledge it enables them to become free to discover further what they do not yet fully know: what it can possibly or ultimately mean to be thinking beings in a seemingly
